Links - 26/04/17

A new links post - finally. And a consequent (possibly temporary) return from the hiatus.

Over the past few weeks I've been busy with exams, so some of the links may be slightly dated. Nevertheless, they remain as interesting.

1. There was AirBnb, then Uber: is it now time for the 'kidney sharing economy'?

2. The effects of British colonialism on India: how bad was it really? I found this stat very revealing:

Another way to make the historical comparison is to consider which Southeast Asian economy never fell under colonial rule. That would be Thailand, which has a per capita income in the range of $16,300 by World Bank estimates, compared with India’s $6,100. 

3. Data collection in the 21st century: face scanners placed in public toilets in China to prevent toilet paper theft.  Toilet paper has some monetary value, but because of its social benefit, it is given to the public for 'free' as a common good. When you think about it, the only thing that stops widespread toilet paper theft is probably a fairly fragile belief in the common good. Its a rather unusual, yet widespread,  phenomena that disrupts the theory of the tragedy of the commons - so it's interesting to see what happens when this rather fragile "social belief" is upended by the more understandable individual desire.

4. Belarus has implemented a sort of "reverse-welfare" law (to put it crudely), where the underemployed have to pay a 'compensation tax', to make up for the taxes they aren't paying because they're underemployed. This policy seems self-perpetuating and counter - intuitive to me -- and needless to say, it has been hugely unpopular. This also invokes a pretty interesting discussion about the politics of Belarus, where political discourse has produced the label "the law against social parasites."

5. In Africa, why do women's rights advance so quickly after major conflict? Or, why are changes related to women's rights developing more rapidly in Africa than in Western countries, despite the former's relatively traditionalist and masculine culture:

 How were post-conflict countries able, in a relatively short span of time, to advance women’s status in key areas? They not only accomplished what the Nordic countries had done over the course of 100 years by increasing legislative representation, but, in some cases, even exceeded their rates almost overnight.

 Basically, major conflicts result in disruptions in traditional gender relations and structures - men are called upon during times of war to act as soldiers, etc. -   leaving a supply gap of sorts left behind, which is then filled by women.

This explains why Rwanda, despite have a male-dominated culture, has the highest proportion of females to males in Parliament. This is just another case of Markets in Everything, a.k.a the economics of gender politics in post conflict regions. It doesn't quite ring...


6. Yet another case study of black markets in fishing. Warning: plenty of puns in the link:

Federal prosecutors say a Massachusetts fishing magnate known as Carlos “The Codfather” Rafael has agreed to plead guilty in a scam involving catch quotas and smuggling money to Portugal. 

According to Hakai magazine, the malevolent fishmonger was selling his illegal catch to mob associate Michael Perretti. Perretti — a convicted felon — ran South Street Seafoods in the heavily mob-infiltrated fish market in New York.

I recall that Iceland also had rampant corruption in its catching quotas too. What is it about the fish market that seems to invite the festering of black markets? My closest guess is that its a 'tragedy of the commons': individual market players act according to their self interest, at the cost of the common good of all players, by depleting that resource through collective action. So, seemingly abundant and immeasurable resources such as the sea, and fish, seem limitless - and people fish to their heart's content, without consideration of the gradual erosion of a common good.

Challenging western voter demographics

Why are young voters turning out in droves for Le Pen?

Since Brexit and the election of Trump, there seems to be a general consensus in the mainstream media about western voter demographics. The narrative seems to be that older voters (say 50+), vote for the isolationist, protectionist option (that is, Brexit and Trump); while young people, having grown up in the era of social media, are more likely to vote for the socially and economically liberal option. American voters aged 18-24 preferred Clinton over  Trump by 55% - 37%; 75% of British voters aged 18-24 voted to remain, with the proportion of voters who voted to exit the EU increasing with age. 

So a general belief has emerged in Western voter demographics: older people = more conservative; and young people under the age of 30 = socially liberal.

So with the upcoming French election, I very much expected to see the aforementioned trends replicated in polls. The election has much of the same features that have been seen across recent elections in the Western world: an ideological clash between the  populist protectionist vs. the social liberal, a disenchanted populace, poor economic conditions. 

Not so!

A new poll on the French election shows that it is in fact younger voters who are throwing their support behind Marine Le Pen, the French presidential candidate of the anti-immigrant, anti - EU Front National  (FN) party. And older voters are more likely to vote for pro business, pro - free trade  Emmanuel Macron. 

See the graph below. Thanks to Ben Judah for the pointer. Unfortunately I wasn't able to find the original source of the graph: 

Form Trump & Brexit  trends shown, one would expect that Le Pen polls particularly well with older voters.  But support for Le Pen (the nationalist candidate)  decreases very strongly as the voters get older, while her support remains comparatively high among younger age groups, peaking at 35% in the 18-24 yrs. 

Meanwhile Macron polls (in my perspective) shockingly low amongst 18-24 group at 11%; ranging from 11-19% for those under 50 years. Adversely, his support has the opposite trend to Le Pen: it decreases as the groups get older, peaking at 28% in the 65+ group.

I find this fascinating - even though older voters tended to support Brexit and Trump, young French voters have completely rejected this pattern - so the question is, why is France not following the trend shown in other Western elections?

For the purpose of succinct analysis, I am only going to focus on Le Pen and Macron, the two candidates who:

1) are polled as the most likely candidates to make it to the final round

2) represent two vastly oppositional positions on most stances (pro EU vs. anti- EU; pro free trade vs anti free trade)

3) represent the seemingly 'ideal' candidates for two different groups: millennial (30 years and under) vs. baby boomers (50 years and older).

Why is there a difference? I have three hypotheses to this fascinating phenomena, listed from most to least relevant:

1. Young French voters have been disproportionately effected by France's economic downturn.

Political activism fundamentally stems from poor economic conditions. Voters who cannot see, or feel, a rise in living standards will turn towards unorthodox options, such as Le Pen. And in the case of young voters, their economic conditions, namely their inability to find a job, have necessitated political action. 

Firstly, youth unemployment in France is 23.6%, and has averaged 20% from the late 1980's to now - overall unemployment is 10%. This means that generally, French youths have been the unfortunate bearers of France's economic stagnation. This inability to find a job can be attributed to a number of factors - overall stagnant growth is one of them - but fundamentally, it comes down to the inflexibility of the labour market.  France's labour market has very generous conditions that greatly benefit those who are already employed - but unfortunately, those very benefits make it very difficult to hire people who are beginning to enter the market, such as young people. 

This systemic rigidity is compounded somewhat by the 'job market culture' in some Western Europe labour markets, such as France and Italy, that incorporate socialist benefits. The culture is generally geared to older, more experienced workers vs. young, entrepreneurial yet untested workers. 

Like fleas to a dog, France's labour market is partially responsible for unemployment and young people becoming inseparable from each other.  While employment prospects of French youths become more doubtful, their counterparts in the U.S and the U.K experience better job prospects. 
So young voters will begin to pivot to alternatives, such as Le Pen, when the political norm doesn't seem to be working. 

2. The memories of the 'dirtier' FN party linger among older voters; but are less familiar to millennials.

The FN was originally founded  in the 1970's, but only achieved prominence during the 1980's to the early 2000's. During this time, it became known for a number of controversial issues - most famously, their reinstatement of the death penalty  and their leader's denial of the Holocaust - leading to the party's slow decline in the 2000's. Marine Le Pen's modern leadership has since revamped the party, altering many of their previously xenophobic connotations. Perhaps older voters restrain from voting for the FN, due to their historic polarisation - but young voters, having grown up in the era of the transformed FN, do not maintain these connotations. 

EDIT: And, just as I am writing and editing this post, Marine Le Pen has just announced that she is stepping down as head of the FN in order to "broaden her appeal."

3. The ramifications of a potential EU exit for older voters.
This theory is perhaps a little less plausible, but I've included it because I find this theory very interesting and unorthodox. One of the central messages of Le Pen's campaign has been the electoral pledge of a Frexit referendum. Exiting the EU - and subsequently abandoning the single currency would be more damaging to the elderly, who have higher savings rates and are more heavily exposed, than the young. 

Of the three theories, ultimately I believe that 1) is the likely cause. In an era where it seems that political affiliations seem to be increasingly decided by age, it is important to remember that at the end of the day, people vote with their feet, not their social media feed.